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Based on a cross-industry panel of 510 non-financial Indian and Chinese firms during the 
period 2005-2015, we argue and show that Chinese firms with resource and asset seeking 
motives and Indian firms with market-seeking motives suffered differently from the financial 
crisis of 2008. Specifically, Indian firms that faced financial market imperfections 
domestically and market contraction externally had to cut back on outward investments as 
markets shrank and sales growth dampened. In contrast, the fortunes of Chinese firms that 
relied on debt finance to seek out international assets rose. Not only had investment targets 
become cheaper after the financial crisis, but the reliance on leverage as the instrument of 
finance also inured Chinese firms to the fluctuations of stock markets and the other financial 
implications of the crisis. Consequently, Chinese and Indian outward investment paths that 
looked so similar before 2008 began to diverge rapidly. 
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In an era of globalised markets and finance, adverse financial institutions at home 
pushed many emerging market multinationals (EMNEs) to raise money for foreign 
investment overseas when they couldn’t find it in domestic external markets. Nayyar (2008) 
notes that international capital markets were an independent and important source of 
financing international investment for many EMNE and were typically not included in 
official national figures for OFDI. Kumar & Chadha (2009) and Saeed & Athreye (2014) also 
argue that liberalisation of economic policy had the effect of mitigating financial constraints 
on domestic and foreign investment for Chinese and Indian firms. Buoyed by domestic 
(financial) liberalisation and a growing global economy, the period from 2000-2009, saw a 
steady increase in outward investment by both Chinese and Indian firms. 
The financial crisis of 2008 abruptly changed all that. World financial markets 
became more cautious about lending and the pull factor of overseas markets suddenly became 
weak after 2008 (Hill & Jongwanich, 2009). Although the impact of the financial crisis for 
the availability of finance seems obvious, EMNEs from India and China also operated in 
economies that were not that exposed to global financial markets (Ghosh and Chandrasekhar, 
2009). Yet Figure 1 below shows that the outward investment paths of Chinese and Indian 
firms began to diverge sharply after the financial crisis. Despite a large literature on EMNE, 
few scholars have paused to ask why this should be the case? Why did the crisis affect 
investments by Indian firms but not Chinese firms? 
[Figure 1 here] 
In this paper, we offer an explanation for the above phenomenon that is rooted in the 
structure of financing and motives of outward investments from firms in the two countries. 
Specifically, we argue that Indian firms that faced financial market imperfections 
domestically and market contraction overseas had to cut back on outward investments as 
markets shrank and sales growth dampened. World Bank data show that in 2015 domestic 
credit availability in India (as a percentage of GDP) increased only marginally from 59.346% 
in 2005 to 75.611%. The bond market was also not much supportive, the amount of capital 
raised through issuing bonds remained between US$ -3.94 billion and US$ 10.339 billion 
during this period. The Initial Public Offering (IPO) market experienced a brief surge in 2010 
with about 100 IPOs in a year; however, it slumped in subsequent years (dropped to 3, 5 and 
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21 IPOs in years 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively). Consequently, Indian firms had to rely 
on internal funds to finance their investments, in the context of shrinking markets for their 
products.  
In contrast, Chinese firms relied heavily on debt finance to seek out international 
assets.  Importantly, their foreign investment targets (distressed assets) became cheaper after 
the financial crisis and the reliance on leverage as the instrument of finance inured Chinese 
firms to the fluctuations of stock markets and the other financial implications of the crisis. 
Domestic credit provided by financial sector (as a percentage of GDP) increased from 
132.591% in 2005 to 194.272% in 2015 and IPO activity in China was markedly higher with 
a record number of 347 IPOs in 2010, however, it slowed down in subsequent years to 42 in 
2015 (Azevedo et al., 2018). Consequently, their outward investment paths that looked so 
similar to that of Indian firms before 2008 began to diverge rapidly. 
Beyond the phenomenological explanation for divergent behaviour in outward 
investments, our study has value for research examining the outward investments of 
emerging markets’ firms.  Current scholarship tends to treat all EMNE as a similar kind of 
firm.  Thus, a widely held view is that EMNE firms have special firm specific advantages 
such as relational assets and flexibility (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Ramamurti, 2009; Buckley et 
al., 2007; Dunning, 2001), which are a result of shared country specific advantages and 
shared similar institutional disadvantages. This is particularly so in the financial sector, where 
EMNE are handicapped by poor financial institutions in their home countries (Bhaumik et al., 
2012; Lardy & Subramanian, 2011), and so the ability to raise financial resources for outward 
investment is a crucial ownership advantage facilitating internationalisation.   
The argument in our paper suggests that a shared institutional disadvantage may 
manifest its effect on firm investment strategies quite differently, depending on EMNE 
outward investment motives and if outward investments take place during a global upswing 
or downswing.  Even though both China and India share the institutional disadvantage of 
weak financial markets, by many indicators one could conclude that the Indian financial 
sector is more market-based and better developed than China’s. Nevertheless, the different 
outward investment motivations of the two groups of firms are an important source of 
heterogeneity in the financing they could secure for their outward investment. Further, as we 
focus on EMNE behaviour over time, we can also see that the relationship between 
motivation, financing and internationalisation is not symmetric between upswing and 
downswing periods.   
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The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way: The next section reviews 
the vast literature that has emerged on EMNE internationalisation and highlight the central 
role accorded to the push and pull of domestic institutions. The role of financial institutions 
have been understudied despite the seminal contribution of Buckley et al., (2007) which 
pointed to the considerable financial market imperfections faced by EMNE. Framing our 
hypothesis development in the context of adverse financial markets and the possible 
responses by EMNE firms to finance outward investment opportunities, we develop 
arguments and testable hypotheses about how financing strategies might have changed in 
response to the global financial crisis.  Section 3 describes our empirical strategy and Section 
4 contains a description of the data and definitions of relevant variables. Empirical results are 
presented in Section 5, followed by a discussion of the implications and main contributions of 
our study in Section 6.  
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1. Weak institutions and outward investment by EMNE 
The widely accepted model of firm internationalisation explains internationalisation 
as an outcome of firm specific advantages (FSA) and country specific advantages (CSA) in 
the home and host countries following Rugman, Verbeke & Nguyen (2011). CSA are the 
advantages of a country which derive from its institutions (following Porter’s diamond this 
could refer to the quality of suppliers, national institutions, natural resource endowments 
and/or competitive environment facing firms) while FSA refers to the advantages of 
particular firms which may reside in their unique capabilities and resources (such as its 
personnel, technology, brands and/or equipment). Combining those two dimensions in a 
matrix, we can predict the internationalisation behaviours employed by the firm. If the CSAs 
of the home country are dominant and FSAs rather weak, economic theories argue that 
comparative advantages of a country (or the location within an industrial cluster) will lead to 
exports – regardless of the specific characteristics of the company. If FSAs are strong and 
CSAs are weak, the focus of the international strategy is on exploiting the company's 
resources, without much influence from the location. In case FSAs and CSAs are both strong, 
a firm has an incentive to operate across borders, coordinate its resources across borders and 
needs to combine the FSA of the company with the CSA of the host country (and, maybe, the 
CSA of the home country) in order to be successful (Rugman et al. 2011, pp. 766-768).  
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Although emerging markets constitute a culturally and economically heterogeneous 
group of nations, their similarity rests on the distinctive and common features of poorly 
functioning institutional environments that hinder the growth of businesses in their countries. 
In the parlance of the CSA/FSA framework, they all suffer from some sort of deficit in their 
CSA, although this may not be uniform across sectors.  Weak home country institutions 
which we may think of as a country specific disadvantage (CSD) have a significant and often 
similar impact on emerging market firms’ internationalization strategies (Luo & Wang, 2012; 
Peng et al., 2008). Thus, the story of internationalisation from emerging markets has been 
seen as a response to the push and pull of institutional factors (or CSD) faced by firms with 
non-standard FSA. 
In their seminal work, Buckley et al., (2007) place considerable emphasis on financial 
market imperfections as a significant CSD common to several emerging market firms 
(including China which is the country of their focus) and argue that such imperfections mean 
access to finance can confer special ownership advantages to State Owned Enterprises. Other 
scholars like Khanna and Yafeh (2005) have argued that in many emerging markets 
organisational forms such as business groups who operate internal markets of finance for 
group companies overcome such financial market disadvantages.  
A large literature has also noted the unique ownership advantages conferred by weak 
institutions, which can underlie internationalisation. Ramamurthi (2009) elaborates the nature 
of such FSAs that derive from an “adverse environment” for business such as EMNE ability 
to adapt imported technology to develop products suited to the special needs of local 
customers.  These adaptations include making products cheaper and more affordable, making 
products that were rugged and easy to maintain in the harsher road conditions, the absence of 
after-sales service and lastly operational and technological efficiency in the presence of poor 
power supply and other infrastructural impediments.  
Going beyond cases, Yiu et al. (2007) investigate the impact of home market 
conditions on the relationship between a firm’s ownership advantages and outward 
investment. They show that a positive relationship between technological capabilities and 
outward investment is contingent on the industry receiving support in the home market. Lu 
and Wang (2012) identify and justify the existence of a systematic association between 
country specific ownership advantages stemming from home market and domestic firms’ 
overseas expansion. Specifically, they show that timing, location and scale of outward 
investment of Chinese firms are dependent on the competitive advantage they gain from 
home market. Similarly, Wang et al. (2012) suggest that government-related ownership 
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advantages shape firms’ level, location, and type of oversees investment. Athreye and Kapur 
(2009) argue that Chinese overseas acquisition is more commonly carried out due to country 
specific advantage of government financial support. Kumar and Chadda (2009) provide 
support for this stylized fact by showing that government support led Chinese firms to 
undertake outward investment primarily in natural resource seeking activities to meet the 
government’s ambition to achieve long term natural resource security of the country. 
Fortanier and van Tulder (2009) also note that foreign investment of Indian and Chinese 
firms is mainly driven by their assets build in domestic markets. Studying  India’s Tata group 
and China’s Haier group, Duysters et al. (2009) show that the advantages associated with 
conglomerate structure, earlier experience, and government support played important roles in 
internationalizing the operations of both firms. Cuervo-Cazurra (2011) finds that many 
EMNE first develop domestically the knowledge to manage complexity and differences in 
competitive conditions and institutional environments that subsequently facilitates their 
foreign expansion, which often inverts traditional notions of internationalisation, where the 
CSA are largely seen as supporting FSA, the exciting finding in the case of EMNE is that 
more successful firms develop hard to imitate FSAs, due to the deficits in CSA.  
In contrast to the above studies which have many looked at the pull of 
internationalisation strategies due to distinctive FSA of EMNE firms, a large literature has 
also argued that institutional imperfections may push EMNE firms towards 
internationalisation to acquire supporting CSA in the host environment. Mathews (2006) in 
the context of his study on the four dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong 
Kong) first suggested that international expansion is not only derived from ownership 
advantages but rather from the advantages firms can access in foreign markets. According to 
him, firms internationalize by acquiring strategic resources through linking in foreign markets 
and leveraging their ownership advantages in combination with new resources. 
Concomitantly, such firms also embraced a learning mentality and adopted novel means of 
learning to ensure foreign market survival. In a similar vein, Luo & Tung (2007) have argued 
that emerging market firms use internationalization as a ‘springboard’ to overcome their 
latecomer disadvantages in the global arena and are not evolutionary but radical in their 
international expansion. These strategic resources include advanced technology, brand name, 
managerial expertise, and access to the customer base in foreign markets. Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Genc (2008) add that emerging market firms may leverage ‘institutional arbitrage,’ which 
indicates these firms’ search for more efficient institutions outside their home markets. 
Athreye and Godley (2009) find that Indian pharmaceutical firms internationalize to 
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overcome their initial disadvantages of being latecomers and gain long term competitive 
advantage. The desire to build lasting competitive advantage, the extent of the technology 
gap, nature of intellectual property rights regimes, and liberalization of financial markets are 
important contextual factors in understanding the growth of pharmaceutical investments from 
Indi. Focusing on location factors, Pradhan (2011) finds that both Chinese and Indian 
multinationals are attracted to foreign destinations having higher cost differentials relative to 
the domestic economy. However, Chinese multinationals prefer destinations with locational 
proximity and small size, whereas Indian multinationals are more likely to target countries 
that have a bilateral investment treaty with India, irrespective of their geographical distance 
from India. Thus, the pull and push arguments for internationalisation stemming from adverse 
institutional environments suggest internationalisation may be used both to exploit and 
augment the distinctive FSA of EMNE and they may also try to overcome institutional 
disadvantages or CSA deficits at home by exploiting CSA at the host country. The motive of 
the internationalising EMNE firm may be quite idiosyncratic and specific to the firm’s 
overall vision and strategy of growth.  
There is considerable empirical evidence that strategic asset and resource seeking 
motives dominated outward investments from China. Buckley et al.(2007) and  Rui & Yip 
(2008) argue that Chinese firms internationalize to acquire strategic capabilities (to enhance 
competitive advantage) and to leverage ownership advantages stemming from lower costs of 
production, large technical workforce, access to state-supported scientific and technical 
research and government financial support. Buckley et al., (2007) and Lu et al., (2011) show 
that supportive government policies generally in the form of governmental investment 
insurance, tax reduction, as well as direct access to investible funds in the form of foreign 
currency and government seeding funds financed both asset and market seeking outward 
investments. 
In contrast, market-seeking motives drove foreign investment from India.  Studies on 
Indian firms suggest a more trade-supporting motive for internationalisation, consistent with 
the exploitation of their FSA tested in export markets (Kumar & Chadha, 2009). Although 
Indian firms also face underdeveloped financial institutions but unlike in China, they do not 
face a complete vacuum of market-based institutions. Direct state intervention in the 
provision of finance for investments is uncommon and firms usually raise finance for 
investment through borrowing on the stock market and utilising internal funds. Consequently, 
business groups with well-functioning internal markets for finance are more frequently at the 
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forefront of internationalisation and ownership advantages are located in family ownership 
and group affiliation (Singh & Kaur, 2014).   
Motives for internationalisation can interact with institutions in a variety of ways and 
recent studies of EMNE strategies are just beginning to uncover these interactions.1 In this 
paper, we aim to extend this line of inquiry by focusing on CSA deficit due to imperfect 
capital market institutions and the FSA conferred by the ability to raise finance for 
investments.  Specifically, we examine how Chinese and Indian firms with resource-seeking 
and market-seeking motives, respectively, benefited differently from the financial market 
immaturity of their economies.  Understanding this interaction, enables us to paint a clearer 
picture of the outward investment trajectory of Chinese and Indian multinationals and explain 
why these trajectories started to diverge after 2008. 
2.2 Hypotheses development: Imperfect financial markets and financing of outward 
investment  
The two most important functions of financial market institutions, viz. the availability 
of credit finance and risk bearing. The availability of credit finance depends upon the 
presence of lenders and borrowers but the ability to spread risks depends on how deep the 
financial market is (thickness of buyers and sellers) and systems of monitoring that can 
evaluate and price risk. Das & Banik (2015) show that although firms in both India and China 
face imperfect financial markets there are important differences between the two countries. 
In India, financial markets are bigger due to a longer history of market relations, and 
financial institutions are also better able to assess risk, but can be sensitive to the riskiness of 
investments, which in turn is reflected in a higher cost of capital for risky investments and 
types of borrowers perceived to be risky. Reform of financial markets in India since 1985, 
has aimed at instilling competition in the banking sector and improving its risk bearing 
capacity.  The appointment of a capital markets regulator in 1988-- the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India— was meant to introduce improved trading practices and greater 
transparency in both the primary and secondary segments of securities market in India.2 The 
ambition of SEBI reforms is to make Indian financial markets suitable for start-ups and 
equity finance, although it is likely that this process is slow and will need the parallel 
 
1 For example, Gubbi et al. (2010). 
2 An interesting aspect of SEBI reforms has been the involvement of leading Indian industrialists such as Infosys 
(software) founder Narayana Murthy, who was one of the first Indian firms to list on NASDAQ and Piramal 
Industries (healthcare) owner Ajay Piramal, who in Jan 2019 raised more than Rs. 5000 crores through bonds 
issued in foreign markets.   
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evolution of stricter systems of property law and contract enforcement. In China, on the other 
hand, the development of financial markets is much more recent and dominated by a few 
large buyers and sellers, many of which are governmental organisations. Financial markets do 
not assess risk well and businesses do not take on all the risk themselves, rather the 
government shoulders a portion of that risk in return for business acting in alignment with 
policy objectives (Lardy & Subramanian, 2011).  
Discriminatory lending practices are prevalent in both Chinese and Indian markets, 
although they happen in different forms. Chinese banks give preferential treatment to 
politically connected firms because bank managers serving on state-owned banks have strong 
incentives for establishing good relationships with governments (Li et al., 2008). Poncet et al. 
(2010) find that political connections are vital in obtaining bank loans for firms operating in 
service industries and operating in areas with a less developed banking sector while 
governance and financial performance are important determinants of lending decisions for 
manufacturing firms. In a similar vein, Chen et al. (2013) find that bribes rather than firm 
performance secure loan access in China. State-owned enterprises (SOE) were not on the 
other hand credit constrained.  In the absence of systematic information and monitoring, 
investment plans from State sponsored actors are simply less likely to be perceived as risky.  
There is some evidence that such discriminatory lending practices may have led to adverse 
selection — Bailey et al. (2011) find that poor financial performance and high managerial 
expenses increase the likelihood of gaining bank loans from state-controlled banks.  
Asymmetric information, rather than state direction, explains discriminatory practices 
and a significant threat of adverse selection, in the Indian credit market. Bhaumik and Piesse 
(2008) also suggest that Indian banks, in general, and private banks, in particular, are more 
risk averse, and less likely to disburse credit. Consequently, larger firms that are in a better 
position to post collateral are less financially constrained as compared to smaller firms and 
younger firms (Bhaumik et al., 2012; Bhaduri, 2008). These groups also experienced a 
significant increase in financial constraints in the post-liberalization period. Similarly, stand-
alone firms also have low access to external funds than business group affiliates (Bhaumik et 
al., 2012). Bhaumik et al. (2018) examine the impact of financial liberalisation on the 
borrowing behaviour and find that private unaffiliated firms and small firms are the most 
vulnerable in the credit market, both before and after liberalisation. In contrast, business 
group affiliated, foreign and state-owned firms benefitted from banking sector reforms.  
The foregoing discussion thus suggests that while both Chinese and Indian firms share 
the CSA deficit due to poorly functioning financial markets, the nature of the institutional 
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challenge and policy responses to it were different in the two countries.  Thus, firms in these 
countries may have faced quite different options in their financing decisions. We consider 
recourse to each of the three main modes of financing by Chinese and Indian firms viz. 
internal cash reserves, drawing on sales revenues and borrowing, to analyse how the use of 
financing strategies may have changed following the financial crisis.  
2.2.1. Mitigating strategies for financing investment: relying on own cash reserves 
Laeven (2003) shows that in the presence of poorly developed capital markets, firms 
investment activity dampens as firms have limited access to informational and financial 
resources. Their theoretical justification relies on Myers & Majluf (1984) who argue that 
when information asymmetry increases, the existence of financial slack (cash reserves) 
directly affects firm investment. Firms having sufficient amount of financial slack will 
undertake all possible investment opportunities where net present value is positive, while 
firms lacking such resources would forgo some of those investible opportunities. Thus, if a 
firm faces high shadow cost of external finance (due to financial market imperfections) then 
there would be a positive relationship between firm investment and cash stock.  
Bhaumik et al., (2012); Carpenter & Guariglia, (2008) and Laeven, (2003) confirm 
that credit-constrained firms will rely on their internal resources to finance investments which 
are deemed risky. This effect is likely to be stronger for firms’ outward investment decisions 
due to the information asymmetry surrounding the uncertainty and riskiness of foreign 
investment (Peng et al., 2008), but might also apply to the financing of riskier investments. 
Cull et al., (2015) demonstrate that even large firms that have the potential to become a hub 
for innovation in the future are often financially constrained when they undertake foreign 
ventures because they are perceived as riskier and Manova et al., (2015) show that financial 
constraints can confine the overall flows of foreign trade.  
Thus, we expect that financial market imperfections in the Indian and Chinese 
economies, will force firms to rely on their internal cash flows for financing outward 
investments and that the extent to which they use their own cash flows to finance investment 
is also a measure of the credit-constrained nature of these firms.  
Hypothesis 1a: Indian and Chinese firms rely on internal cash flows to finance both domestic 
and foreign investment.  
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The financial crisis of 2008 has may have increased firms’ dependence upon their 
internal cash flows. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 2009 following 
the financial crisis, world trade flows decreased by almost 12%. This happened due to a 
credit crunch, which increased financial constraints thus restraining production and reducing 
exports. Austerity policies in many advanced economies and interbank lending rates across 
countries were higher, increasing interest rates. Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010) show that new 
loans to large borrowers decreased by almost 79% during the period of the financial crisis. In 
addition to bank loans, Hill & Jongwanich (2009) argue that the financial crisis reduced the 
opportunity to raise external funds through initial public offerings, corporate bonds, and the 
sharp fall in global equity prices. 
Although India and China were widely believed to have escaped the effect of the 
financial crisis because of their smaller reliance on international markets when compared to 
countries in Europe and North America (Reddy et al., 2014), the inability of even large firms 
to increase external financing may have compelled them to restrict their international 
activities. In particular, the collapse of commodity prices and low consumer demand in the 
developed world due to the recession had an adverse effect on the available financial 
resources from sales to fund investments. Ghosh and Chandrasekhar (2009) show that the 
Indian economy was adversely affected by the global financial crisis due to the greater 
reliance on exports particularly of services (~24.27% of GDP in 2008), higher dependence on 
capital inflows (about 9% of GDP in 2008), and the role that inward capital had played in 
underpinning a domestic credit-fuelled consumption and investment boom.  
Although China continued to have one of the highest rates of economic growth across 
the globe, recording 9.6% in 2008 and 9.2% in 2009, these rates hide the substantial drop 
from the 14.2% growth that China enjoyed in 2007.  The most visible damage was the sharp 
decline of export-orientated industry. In November 2008, China’s export growth rate fell 
sharply from 20% in the previous month to −2.2 % (Li et al., 2012).  The immediate effect of 
the financial crisis was the crash of the stock market in China, which wiped out more than 
two-thirds of its market value. Many Western partners of local Chinese banks (e.g. Bank of 
America, UBS, and RBS) sold their minority stakes to retrieve capital. At the same time, 
China’s sovereign wealth fund (China Investment Corporation, CIC) also suffered huge 
losses due to their engagement in Western companies. There was some offset due to the 
gradual appreciation of the Renminbi against other currencies.  
Figure 2 below uses World Bank data to look at the availability of bank loans to the 
private sector in India and China before and after the crisis. While bank credit to Indian firms 
13 
 
contracted from 2010, we see no such tendency in Chinese bank lending which continued to 
rise.  Other indicators such as domestic credit to the private sector and the overall credit 
provided by the financial sector show similar trends. World Bank data shows that domestic 
credit provided by the financial sector (as a percentage of GDP) increased by 81.27% from 
2008 - 2017 for China whereas this increase is only 4.31% for India (where it rose from 
69.1% of GDP in 2008 to 72.07% in 2017).   
[Figure 2 here] 
Thus, the global financial crisis decreased the supply of domestic as well as foreign 
credit for Indian but the picture for Chinese firms was different as the firms enjoyed 
expanded credit into the economy.  Elliot and Yan (2013) note that the banking system 
provided the bulk of the economic stimulus in the form of easier loans after the global 
financial crisis had struck in 2008. Liu et al. (2018) find that while the economic stimulus 
package did not mitigate the lending inefficiencies in the Chinese financial system, the 
government support package did result in more resources being available for investment by 
state-owned firms.   
Hypothesis 1b: The financial crisis increased the reliance on own funds to finance 
domestic and foreign investments in India but not for Chinese firms as they received 
expanded credit in the post crisis period. 
2.2.2. Motives for outward FDI and their influence on financing modes  
The motives for outward investment may also play a large role in determining the 
financing modes of outward investment.  Dunning (1988)’s eclectic paradigm distinguished 
between the motivations behind foreign investments of enterprises as market, efficiency (or 
cost reduction) or resource (or strategic asset) seeking. Resource and asset seeking firms 
engage in overseas investment to acquire strategic assets to gain the ownership advantages 
that they lack (Gaur et al., 2018; Luo & Tung, 2007) while market seeking firms aim to 
exploit their existing competitive advantages.  Market seeking investments are easily 
financed by sales revenue but asset seeking investments promise income in the longer term 
and must at least partly be financed by borrowing.  Such borrowing could take several forms:  
Firms belonging to business groups could borrow from other parts of a business group.  State 
enterprises could borrow from government banks and standalone firms could borrow from 
capital markets at home and abroad.  The generalised nature of the financial crisis inevitably 
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affected many of these sources of financing.  For market seeking investors, sales markets 
shrank, reducing the finance available from sales revenues.  Those relying on borrowing also 
saw a shrinkage of sources of finance raised from capital markets, though business group 
borrowing and loans from the state were less likely to shrink.  Indeed in all countries, 
stimulus packages were designed to ensure that the state 
Elango & Pattnaik (2007) argue that emerging MNEs that lack marketing advantages 
and R&D, may target large international markets that contain sufficient resources within 
them. Such market seeking investments are often self-financing, i.e. sales from earlier periods 
are financing future investments. There is ample evidence that Indian firms’ outward 
investment had market-seeking motives (e.g., Deng & Yang, 2015; Gubbi et al., 2010).  Paul 
(2014) identifies market-seeking motives as particularly important for investments in the 
African region where India also has Bilateral Investment Agreements with seven African 
countries.  
The financial crisis of 2008 prompted a recession in many advanced economies and a 
gradual closing down of markets for India’s important export sectors (software, pharma), 
where a large part of the country’s outward investment was concentrated. Internationalising 
firms found it difficult to raise more money and expand overseas. The financial reforms in 
India which sought to improve the transparency and efficiency of domestic capital markets 
had also brought some constraints for Indian firms that wanted to borrow on external capital 
markets.  External borrowing would show up as leverage and potentially constrain future 
borrowing by worsening the credit rating of firms, so firms stayed away from external 
borrowing as far as they could.  This is also reflected in Figure 2, discussed earlier. 
In contrast, empirical studies provide evidence for resource-seeking motives of 
Chinese firms (see Andreff, 2016; Nicholson & Salaber, 2013). The financial crisis 
represented a unique opportunity for many Chinese and other EMNE firms that sought such 
strategic assets because the devaluation of assets in crisis-hit economies, particularly Europe 
and US, meant it was now possible to buy such strategic assets at bargain prices. The 
economic crisis depressed asset prices globally, and Chinese firms launched multibillion-
dollar bids for distressed resource firms (many in Europe), while the Chinese government 
promoted outbound investments by broadening financing channels and easing regulatory 
procedures for firms with overseas ambitions. In fact, fourteen Chinese acquisitions were 
completed in Spain and two in Portugal in 2009 (both these countries were severely hit by the 
financial crisis in 2008 and consequently they were forced to undervalue the public assets). 
Another good illustration of such an opportunistic takeover is the Chinese shipping giant 
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Chinese Ocean Shipping Corporation (COSCO), which acquired the rights to operate the two 
main container terminals at Piraeus port outside Athens, Greece in 2009. The successful 
acquisition of Volvo Cars by Zhejiang Geely Holding Group's (Geely) is another example of 
acquisition of undervalued assets due to the financial crisis.  
Many Chinese asset-seeking investments are financed by borrowing, notably from 
banks who disbursed loans according to Governmental priorities and provided bank credit 
with low interest rates. Figure 2 shown earlier gives evidence of the expanded credit to the 
private sector in the post crisis China. Politically connected Chinese firms enjoyed 
preferential treatment in the credit market (e.g., Hung et al., 2017; Du & Lu, 2016).  More 
importantly, the reasons for eschewing debt in India did not apply in China as politically 
connected firms are perceived as less risky.  Indeed, higher stocks of debt (or leverage) may 
even signal political connections and low risk in the Chinese context. 
Thus, the motives of investment and the financial constraints faced by firms due to 
immature institutions after the financial crisis resulted in different structures of financing for 
outward investment of Chinese and Indian firms. Chinese firms, as already noted extensively 
in the literature and in detail by Buckley et al., (2007), could always raise the money for their 
resource seeking investments through borrowing from the state and other financial 
institutions directed by the state and their investment targets were now cheaper. In contrast, 
Indian firms that depended upon external funds -- domestic capital markets and financial 
listing abroad for financing—were less likely to raise finance from these sources due to a 
slowdown in market growth and pessimism about future growth opportunities. The growth in 
outward FDI from India and China began to diverge because of this interaction between 
motives and financing modes. 
Based on the above reasoning, we propose the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 2a. Overseas investment of market seeking Indian firms are positively 
affected by their overseas sales, but overseas sales do not have a significant impact on the 
overseas investment of strategic asset seeking Chinese firms. 
Hypothesis 2b.  The positive impact of overseas sale on overseas investments of 
Indian firms would decrease after the financial crisis.  
Hypothesis 3a.  Overseas investment of Indian firms, which do not receive additional 
support from India’s banks and bond market investors, will be adversely affected by their 
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leverage while the overseas investment of Chinese firms, which receive support of Chinese 
banks, are unaffected by their leverage..  
Hypothesis 3b. The adverse impact of leverage on overseas investments of Indian 
firms would increase after the financial crisis but the overseas investments of Chinese firms 
would continue to be unaffected. 
2.2.3. Other factors influencing financing behaviour 
 Other factors have been highlighted in the literature as influencing financing and therefore 
investment behaviour. We note them here (and control for their influence in our empirical 
analysis) although they are not the focus of our analysis.  
 One way to mitigate the effect of imperfect financial markets is that firms in emerging 
markets may develop organizational forms that facilitate the sharing of institutionally bound 
resources and the internalization of inefficient markets (Hoshi et al., 1991). Business groups, 
which are collections of independent firms from various industries, connected either formally 
or informally, but usually through holding groups that redistribute resources across group 
members are dominant in emerging markets (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005). The potential sources 
of gain from business group affiliation include the spreading of risk through a group 
structure, economies of scale and scope, and utilisation of vital resources in different contexts 
including in information sharing and pooling (Buckley & Casson, 1998; Buckley et al., 2002; 
Buckley, 2018). Although group membership may make financial resources available, such 
investments may not be efficient -- see evidence from Lins & Servaes (1999) on Japanese 
firms and Shin & Park (1999) for the Korean firms. 
 Research examining the financing structure of group affiliates has concentrated on 
their lending relationships to banks and fund allocation amongst affiliated firms to ease 
borrowing constraints in the capital market. Keister (1998) notes that business groups 
function as ‘insider lenders’, allowing affiliated firms’ access to otherwise scarce funds when 
capital market is inadequate at allocating finance while Hoshi et al., (1991) found that 
Japanese keiretsu firms maintain strong relationships with banks; they, therefore, face less 
financial constraints to their investment. Redistribution within business groups may move 
resources from stronger to weaker firms that may facilitate survival during difficult times.  
Studies also show that it is more difficult to use internal resources to finance overseas 
investments (Estrin et al., 2009) and that as business groups are also prone to moral hazard, 
they might eschew the higher risks associated with overseas investments (Bhaumik and Zhou, 
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2014). Bhaumik et al (2012) also doubt that business groups can sustain the advantages 
associated with internal capital markets indefinitely and suggest any such advantages may not 
sustain higher levels of outward investment. 
The weakness of formal institutions such as property rights and rule of law can be 
overcome by the direct state-ownership of firms (La Porta et al., 1999). State-owned 
enterprises (SOE) typically have soft budget constraints since they have strong resource 
dependent relationships with home-country institutions (Lu et al., 2014). Moreover, the main 
function of state-owned firms is not to maximize profit, but rather to support the strategic 
investment goals of a directed industrial policy (Wang et al., 2012). Buckley et al., (2007) 
show that Chinese firms enjoy privileged access to finance on preferential terms while Morck 
et al., (2008) also show that the cost of capital is substantially lower for Chinese SOE 
compared to private firms. Preferential treatment and easier access to low cost capital can 
spur firms from emerging markets to invest overseas as they can mitigate financial risks 
associated with foreign investments, and benefit from the subsidization of less profitable 
technology, particularly in developed markets (Buckley, 2018; Ramasamy et al., 2012). 
Ramasamy et al., (2012) also argue that SOE in emerging markets also have access to more 
accurate and detailed information about technology and new investment opportunities.  
Pinkham & Peng (2017) show that firms can build contract safeguards by using 
another country’s institutions (institutional borrowing). In the context of weak financial 
market institutions at home, firms may opt to seek foreign listing (also called cross listing as 
many such firms are already listed on domestic markets) to obtain new sources of cash flows. 
Measures to deregulate foreign currency transactions and allow domestic firms to take 
foreign currency in and out of the country for investment purposes facilitated such listing3. 
Temouri et al., (2016) also distinguish between the signalling and bonding functions of cross 
listing and show that both contributed to a firms’ internationalisation strategy. 
In view of this previous work, we include business group affiliation, being an SOE 
and whether a firm listed on an overseas stock exchange as independent controls that could 
mitigate the availability of internal resources for investment.  
3.  Empirical Strategy 
 
3 Whether reforms achieved their objective in developing economies has been a subject of active empirical 
research which has yielded mixed findings (See Temouri et al., 2016, Bhaumik et al., 2012; Laeven, 2003, for a 
review of studies).  
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To test the long run investment decision based on shadow cost of capital, which is 
higher than the market price whenever capital is constrained, we adopt the Euler model of 
investment which is based on Laeven (2003) and Ratti et al. (2008). It models investment 
expenditure as an autoregressive function of a vector of firm specific characteristics and also 
includes the square term of its lagged investment as an independent variable4. Unlike the 
alternative strand of studies originating from Fazzari et al. (1988) and further developed by 
subsequent studies such as Bhaumik et al. (2012), Euler model avoids the reliance on market 
value—Tobin’s Q.  Therefore, it has a better control for the effect of shocks to future return 
on investments thus reducing any bias to the coefficient on financial constraint. Moreover, 
Euler model allows explicit modelling of the shadow cost of financing as a function of cash 
reserves. Foreign operations offer both additional risk (exchange rate, political) as well as 
growth opportunities. Conducting business at distance, however, makes it difficult for 
domestic investors to retrieve information about a firm’s economic situation and Bodnar & 
Weintrop (1997) argue that a firm faces a higher degree of financial constraints for foreign 
investment as opposed to domestic investment.  
The basic investment equation used in the literature on financing investment behaviour 
is (1) below: 
 
We assume this model can also explain the overseas investment of the firm. Most of the 
literature on EMNE implicitly assumes independence of foreign and domestic investment 
decisions as outward investment decisions are driven by CSA factors, which are unlikely to 
influence domestic investments.5 We allow domestic market opportunities to influence 
foreign investment, although this probably only applies to market seeking outward 
investments. In principle, the sign of the coefficient capturing domestic investment 
opportunity may be positive (indicating complementarity), negative (substitutability) or zero 
(indicating independence of the domestic and foreign investment decisions.  
 
4 See Laeven (2003) for detailed derivation of the investment function. 
5 At the macroeconomic level, however, we should expect outward investment in the economy to influence 
domestic investments, through its effect on aggregate demand and due to scale effects in R&D and 
production.  See Dasgupta (2017) for a test of the macroeconomic hypothesis of complementarity of domestic 
and foreign investment for BRIC countries. 
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We also augment the variables included in the RHS of (1) based on the discussion of 
Section 2.  If If represents foreign investment, the equation for foreign investment is specified 




 The variables included on the RHS reflect our conjectures and hypotheses. The variable 
of interest for Hypotheses 1a and 1b is the operating cash flow (CF). A firm when financially 
constrained does not have access to external finance to undertake investment and may rely on 
internally available financial capital. The investment-cash flow sensitivity (  is a measure 
of the financial constraint faced by firms and expected to be negative (Hypothesis 1a).  We 
interact this variable with the financial crisis (FC), which is a dummy variable. Our 
expectation is that the coefficient on this interaction term ( is positive for Indian firms 
but negative for Chinese firms (Hypothesis 1b)6.  
 A firm can finance its investment is by relying on its sales income and borrowing or 
incurring leverage. To test hypotheses H2a and H3a, For_Salei,t-1 that is firm level 1-year 
lagged foreign sale and Leveragei,t-1 that is one-year lagged total leverage are added in the 
model respectively. Hypothesis 2a implies that  is positive for (market seeking) Indian 
firms. The coefficient on cross term For_Sale×FC ( ) tests Hypothesis 2b, and we expect 
this coefficent to negative for (market-seeking) Indian firms. The influence of Leverage on 
the financing of investment is more complex. While borrowing allows firms to raise financial 
resources needed for investment, high levels of leverage are also making a firm less 
creditworthy. For this reason, we should expect the coefficient of Leverage ( ) to be 
negative. However, this reasoning does not apply in the presence of non-market strategies (as 
in the case of China) and in Hypothesis 3a, we expect  > 0 for (asset seeking) Chinese 
firms. To test the Hypothesis 3b, the interaction term Leverage×FC is introduced, and we 
expect that its coefficient (  ) is positive for (asset seeking) Chinese firms. 
 
6 We also estimated simultaneous equations for domestic and foreign investments (without including the moving 
average of sales) and our results were broadly consistent. All three hypotheses found support and the 
coefficients of the levels of foreign and domestic investment had no impact on each other.  Results of this 
estimation are available from the authors upon request. 
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 To control for known responses to imperfect capital markets, as discussed in Sections 
2.2.3, we include Business-group affiliation, State-ownership and Foreign Listing as 
individual terms and as factors mitigating the financial constraints (expressed as dependence 
on the Cash Flow). As these are mitigating factors, we expect in each case the CF interacted 
term to have a negative coefficient. Lastly, we include moving average of domestic sale, 
MA_Dom_Sale (to capture the impact of growth of domestic markets (and the potential for 
domestic investment) on foreign investments. 
 We describe the construction of the variables used in the empirical estimations in Table 
2 below. To normalise the distribution of the error term, all variables are scaled by the 
contemporaneous measure of capital stock (K).   
 The error term εi,t is orthogonal to any information available at the time of the 
investment decision. As equation (2) is a dynamic model we use the Arellano Bond GMM 
method (using xtabond2 GMM command in Stata) to estimate the model. 
4. Data and Measurement of the Variables 
4.1. Data Source and Sample Selection Criteria 
The data used in this paper come from the ORBIS database, provided by Bureau van 
Dijk (BvD). ORBIS contains firm level data that provide detailed information on financial 
accounts and other firm specific information for more than 650,000 firms. Our sample 
includes data on 510 large Indian and Chinese non-financial firms with foreign subsidiaries. 
ORBIS defines very large companies as those with operating revenue of at least US$40 
million or over 1,000 employees. Indian firms (298) represent 58% of the total sample and 
Chinese firms (212) account for the remaining 42% of the sample.  
We use an unbalanced panel dataset since this type of panel structure has the benefit of 
partially mitigating potential selection and survival bias problems (Carpenter & Guariglia, 
2008). We focus on listed non-financial firms operating in the period 2005 to 2015. The focus 
on listed firms is due to two main reasons. First, since our estimation model investigates the 
effect of the crisis on the availability of finance for which credit through foreign listings is an 
important source, only publicly listed firms are appropriate for this study; second, accounting 
data quality is better for listed firms. 
We include firms with observations for at least five years but exclude firms with 
missing values for any of the explanatory variables and firm-years that report negative values 
for capital stock and sales. To mitigate the effect of outliers and errors in the data we also 
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exclude observations with extreme values for the variables relative to their means (Ratti et al., 
2008). Thus, we exclude observations with I/K above 2.5, CF/K above 0.7, Sale/K above 20 
and Leverage/K above 10.  In all, we exclude a total of 46 observations from the sample to 
obtain an unbalanced panel of 3908 firm-year observations for our statistical analysis.   
Table 1 presents the distribution of our sample across countries and industries. Most 
of the Indian firms belong to the Textile products (35), Chemicals (33) and Software (IT) 
industry (32) sectors. Chinese firms belong to Textile products (26), Chemicals (24), 
Electronics (22) and Oil & Gas sub-sector (17). The industry composition of investment from 
the two countries is different-- only about a third of the sample in both countries operated in 
the same industries. 
4.2. Variable measurement 
Table 2 presents the sources and definition of the variables used in the estimations. 
We measure total investment as the change in capital stock at the end of the 
accounting year, net of depreciation. We calculate annual depreciation as the difference 
between the accumulated depreciation in the current year and the depreciation in the previous 
year. Capital stock (K) is the balance sheet item, ‘Tangible Fixed Assets’ and includes 
accumulated depreciation. Specifically, capital stock is the sum of machinery, plant, 
equipment, buildings, land, property, other tangible assets, and construction-in-progress.7  
As ORBIS does not report separate balance sheet figures for firms’ foreign 
investments; therefore, we reverted to the financial statements of the foreign subsidiaries, 
treated the change in their capital stock from the previous year plus depreciation, as the firm’s 
foreign investment, and scaled it by the contemporaneous measure of capital stock (K).   
We use the operating cash flow (CF) as a measure of the firm’s reliance on its own 
financial resources. Firm Leverage is the firm’s total long-term and short-term leverage as 
reported in ORBIS. Sales figures measure the firm’s total sales in a specific period are also 
reported in ORBIS. We compute Foreign sale as the sum of sales of all foreign subsidiaries. 
Domestic sale is the difference between firm’s Sales and Foreign sale, and we use the three-
year moving average of domestic sales as a proxy for domestic market opportunities.  
To measure the impact of the financial crisis on foreign investment, we use two 
measures. We create a dummy variable Financial Crisis (FC), (taking value 1 after 2009 and 
0 before) as a measure of the impact of the financial crisis to show a sharper effect 
 
7 Inventories are reported separately in ORBIS but we do not include them in the calculations. 
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contrasting the period before and after the financial crisis. The interacted terms in the 
equation (2) then reflect post-crisis values. An alternative measure of the financial crisis 
captures the increasing (decreasing) impact of the crisis after the financial crisis. It takes 
value 0 before 2009 and is incrementally increasing from 2009 (specifically, it takes value 0 
for years 2005, 2006, 2007 & 2008 while takes value 1 for 2009, 2 for 2010 and so on).  
Foreign listing, business-group affiliation and state-ownership are additional control 
variables: A group affiliated firm is part of a business group. A firm is defined as state-owned 
if there is any proportion of government ownership. To measure the importance of finance 
from international markets, we include a variable for foreign listing, (FList). In all three 
cases, a dummy variable takes the value 1 if a firm is part of a business group, SOE or 
included in an international listing in a given year. 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 reports the number of observations, mean values, median values, and standard 
deviation values of all variables. There are 2475 observations for Indian firms, while Chinese 
firms have 1433 observations. The descriptive statistics highlight the differences in financing 
and investment behaviour in the two economies and are consistent with what we know about 
the two economies from other sources. 
Chinese firms invested very heavily (almost 80% of their capital stock) compared to 
Indian firms (60% of their capital stock). Mean values suggest Chinese firms have much 
higher rates of domestic investment than do Indian firms-- consistent with the higher rate of 
growth of the Chinese economy. 
The cash‐flow ratio is higher for Chinese firms at around 46%, compared to 34% for Indian 
firms. Chinese firms are mainly dependent on their leverage, and there is a significant difference 
between Indian and Chinese firms with regard to leverage utilization. The mean leverage ratio of 
Indian firms is 0.63, compared to 4.20 for Chinese firms. On average, Indian and Chinese firms have 
foreign sale ratio of 0.59 and 0.68 respectively. 
About 39% of Indian firms are part of a business group compared to 17% of Chinese 
firms and more than 19% of Chinese firms have some fraction of state ownership. Almost 
30% of Indian firms listed abroad compared to 27% of Chinese firms 
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The values of standard deviation of variables of interest are close to their respective 
mean values. The mean and median values are also close to each other. This indicates that our 
variables are normally distributed. The correlation table (in Appendix 1) does not raise any 
concerns about multicollinearity. 
5.2. The financial crisis and outward investments: the baseline model 8 
Equation (2) separately estimated for Indian and Chinese firms is reported in Table 4.  
Columns (1) and (2) refer to the baseline model results (Panel A) using the measure of FC as 
a dummy variable that distinguishes between two periods i.e. pre and post crisis. Columns (3) 
and (4) show the results when we measure Financial Crisis as a count variable (Panel B). 
Insignificant probabilities of Arellano-Bond AR(2) indicates the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis viz. there is no serial correlation while the Hansen tests in all four cases confirm 
the  instruments are valid (and the equation is not over-identified). 
Neither the lagged levels of foreign investment (λ1) nor the squared (lagged) foreign 
investment (λ2) have much influence on the current levels of foreign investment. As we 
expected, the coefficient for cash flow (λ3), which captures the extent of the financial 
constraint on foreign investment is positive and statistically significant for both countries, 
indicating the presence of financial constraints. For India, a 1% increase in internal cash flow 
is likely to finance a 4.14% increase in foreign investment9, while for China, a 1% increase in 
cash flow causes 2.09% increase in foreign investment. Both these results support Hypothesis 
1a. 
The coefficient on the FC ( ) is not by itself a significant influence in Panel A but in 
Panel B there is a weak negative influence on Chinese investments. However, the coefficient 
of the interactive term FC ×CF (λ5) is positive and significant for foreign investment of 
Indian firms, consistent with Hypothesis 1b, and confirming that the financial crisis increased 
the credit constraints on Indian firms. However, as we hypothesised, based on the work of 
Liu et al (2012) and others, cash injections following the crisis in China made it easier for 
Chinese firms to raise resources after the financial crisis—thus the sign of coefficient (λ5) is 
negative and significant. We may attribute the difference in signs on the interacted CF 
variable to the active governmental support to Chinese firms in the post-crisis period, 
whereas Indian firms lacked such assistance.  
 
8 We are very grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments that shaped the writing of our 
empirical analysis. 
9 Measured as coefficient of cash flow multiplied by the ratio of mean values of cash value and investment.    
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
Indian firms finance their foreign investment by revenue from foreign sales. The 
estimated coefficient ( 8) is positive and statistically significant for foreign investments of 
Indian firms. A 1% increase in the foreign sale to capital ratio causes 0.91% increase in 
Indian foreign investment. For Chinese foreign investment, the effect of Foreign Sale is 
statistically insignificant. This finding supports our Hypothesis 2a. We hypothesised (H2b) 
that the financial crisis weakened the foreign sale and foreign investment relationship, 
obtained for Indian case, due to the shrinking the foreign markets. As we expected the 
coefficient 9 is negative and statistically significant for foreign investment of Indian firms 
whereas for Chinese firms 9 remains statistically insignificant (accepting Hypothesis 2b).  
The estimated coefficient ( 11) of the Leverage is positive and significant for Chinese 
foreign investment indicating the reliance on debt as non-market mediated means of 
financing.10 From the estimated coefficient, we can infer that a 1% increase in leverage 
causes 1.29% increase in Chinese foreign investment. For Indian firms, the relationship 
between leverage and overseas investment is negative but statistically insignificant. From the 
riskiness perspective, support from the Chinese government-backed banks may have reduced 
the risk associated with the higher usage of leverage for Chinese overseas investment. 
However, Indian foreign investments are vulnerable to higher leverage risk due to the more 
market mediated nature of the financing. Our finding support Hypothesis 3a. This effect is 
further strengthened in the post-crisis period. As results show that the effect of debt continues 
to be positive for the Chinese case, the coefficient ( 12) is positive and statistically 
significant for foreign investment of Chinese firms (accepting Hypothesis 3b). Taken 
together, our results strongly confirm that it was not the financial crisis by itself but its 
influence on modes of financing (themselves related to motives for outward investment) that 
caused outward investment paths of China and India to diverge. 
The results of the control variables are as expected. The coefficient of moving average 
of domestic sale ( 10) is statistically insignificant for both Indian and Chinese firms 
suggesting domestic market opportunities do not influence foreign investments -- confirming 
the implicit assumption in many studies of outward investment.  The estimated coefficient of 
the interaction between business group and cash flow ( 14) is not statistically significant for 
 
10 As noted in section 2, in well-developed capital markets more leverage will restrict investment because a 
higher leverage ratio for a firm will represent a higher leverage ratio and more financial constraint in terms of 
default risk (Arellano et al., 2012). 
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foreign investments of both Indian and Chinese business group firms. This result casts doubt 
about the existence of internal capital markets that fund transfer among business group 
affiliates since 2005 and is consistent with the findings of Sasidharan et al. (2015), Bhaumik 
et al. (2012) and George et al. (2011) who have argued that the advantages of group 
membership wane over time. The interaction between state-ownership and cash flow ( 16) is 
statistically insignificant for foreign investment of the Indian sample, but for Chinese firms, 
state-ownership does mitigate the credit constraint for foreign investment (negative and 
significant -- 16). This result is again consistent with numerous studies that point to the 
important role of state-driven foreign investment from China. The variable measuring the 
impact of foreign listing on credit constraints ( 7) has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on foreign investments of both Indian and Chinese firms. Our result suggests foreign 
listings do help to mitigate the credit constraints on foreign investments for firms from both 
countries as noted in earlier studies by Poncet et al., (2010), Nayyar (2008), and Huang 
(2003). 
Columns 3 and 4 (Panel B) of Table 4 present the results of using an alternative 
measure of FC. Again, there is strong support for Hypothesis 1a and 1b. Indian firms show a 
worsening of the financial constraint on outward foreign investment post crisis, while 
Chinese firms see an easing of credit constraints. Consistent with Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we 
find that Indian firms rely on foreign sales financing before the crisis and this reliance on this 
source of finance weakens post crisis, but we only find partial support for Hypothesis 3a. 
Chinese firms do rely more on leverage post crisis (consistent with Hypothesis 3b) but there 
is no suggestion that leverage was important as the mode of finance pre-crisis. 
5.3. Model extension: Heterogeneity of motives among firms in a single country 
Although in the baseline model and subsequent arguments, we have used the 
simplification of characterising all Indian firms as market seeking and all Chinese firms as 
strategic asset seeking, the reality is more complex. The same firm may have some FDI 
projects that are market seeking and other FDI which is strategic asset seeking. The ideal data 
to delineate these mixed motives is project-based data but we do not have such detailed 
information linked to financial information. Nor can we employ a primary source of data in 
the form of a survey or interviews to identity the outward FDI motive of each firm (Lu et al., 
2011). Some studies use intangible assets such as intellectual property including patents & 
trademarks, goodwill, and brand recognition to distinguish between market-seeking and 
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strategic asset-seeking motives of the firm (Elia and Santangelo, 2012; Lu et al. 2011; 
Buckley et al., 2007) but the information on firm-level patent counts and trademarks are not 
readily available in ORBIS. 
Studies that adopt an ‘industry-based view’ define the outward FDI motive of a firm 
through the industry in which firm operates (Brouthers et al. 2008; Lu et al. 2011). For 
instance, outward investment is identified as market seeking if the firm belongs to 
wholesaling, retailing, transportation, storage, real estate, and financial services. On the other 
hand, outward investment of firms operating in technologically advanced or natural resources 
related sectors, for instance, equipment manufacturing, automobile, pharmaceutical, mining, 
and petroleum, is identified as strategic asset-seeking. We follow this approach and classified 
firms’ outward FDI as driven by a market-seeking motive if the firm belongs to textile, 
engineering services, agriculture, construction, and miscellaneous sectors, while outward FDI 
from technological advanced sectors (automobile, electronics, iron & steel, chemicals, 
pharmaceutical, telecommunication, and software-IT sectors) and industries related to natural 
resources (oil & gas and mining) was classified as strategic asset-seeking. Splitting the 
sample in this way, we find only 41% of Indian firms were market seeking while 66% of 
Chinese firms were asset seeking 
Since our data is at parent-level where outward FDI is the accumulated sum of 
outward investments through several foreign subsidiaries, there is a possibility that a parent 
firm undertakes more than one outward investment with different motives. We encounter this 
issue with 76 firms in which we found a firm has foreign subsidiaries in different industries. 
For instance, Reliance Industries has foreign subsidiaries in Oil & Gas sector (Gulf Africa 
Petroleum Corporation) and in Textile sector (Recron Malaysia Sdn. Bhd). Due to the 
multiple motives of the outward FDI, we are unable to classify such firms; therefore, we have 
to exclude 30 Indian and 46 Chinese firms from the sample.  
We re-estimate equation (2) on outward investment based on these sub-samples of 
market seeking and strategic assets seeking firms in India and China. The results presented in 
Table 5 confirm all our main hypotheses. Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, both market and 
strategic asset seeking outward investments by Indian firms saw a worsening of the credit 
constraint, while strategic asset seeking investments from China saw a lifting of credit 
constraints. Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, Indian outward investment driven by market-
seeking motives show a positive and statistically significant impact of foreign sales finance. 
This effect weakens after the financial crisis (λ9 is negative and significant—Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2b). Further, we do not observe the same effect for Indian investment with 
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strategic asset-seeking motive. Consistent with hypothesis 3a, for China the impact of 
leverage finance (λ11) is positive and significant for both types of investments and post crisis 
period the positive impact of leverage persists for strategic asset-seeking investments (λ12 is 
positive and significant—consistent with Hypothesis 3b).  
Overall, the findings indicate that the financial crisis of 2009 adversely affected 
foreign investment by Indian firms while foreign investment by strategic asset-seeking 
Chinese firms survived and expanded after the financial crisis. Importantly, the financial 
crisis influenced these outcomes by adversely influencing some forms of financing of 
outward investments. 
5.4 Robustness tests 
We subjected our estimations to further tests in order to understand the robustness of our 
results11. First, we re-estimate model 3 with two-way clustering, by time and industry, 
following Cameron et al. (2011). The main results largely remain the same and consistent 
with our earlier baseline results (Table 4). Importantly, results with two-way clustering lend 
support for our all hypotheses.  
Although we have used the system GMM estimation technique, which deals with 
potential endogeneity by using lagged explanatory variables as instruments, we also 
statistically ascertain that our results do not suffer from endogeneity bias. The results 
(reported in Appendix 1) confirm our model does not suffer from endogeneity.  
5.4.1: Sources of firm heterogeneity and its influence on the results 
Effect of region of origin: In view of the large literature highlighting the effect of regional 
differences on firm’s investment (Ning et al., 2016; Aiello et al., 2012), we tried to control 
for the region of origin effect on investment by adding 3 regional dummies namely 
South_Central, North_West, and East regions in model 3 for both countries. Regional 
dummies had an insignificant impact on foreign investment of Chinese firms and test for the 
inclusion of the new variables rejects their inclusion. This result most likely reflects the 
limited nature of our data where there are very few observations for each of the dominant 
regions, so that pooling the data was better for estimation. 
 
11 Please see the results of the robustness tests contained in Appendix 1 
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Exclusion of state-owned firms: As discussed in section 2.2.3, state-owned firms enjoy 
privileged treatment in the credit market, which offers them an additional advantage over 
private firms to undertake local and foreign investments. So, our results for China could be 
the outcome of a larger share of SOE in the sample. To check for this possibility, we exclude 
state-owned firms from the sample and re-estimate the models only for private (non-state-
owned) firms. When we do this, the results for Hypotheses 3a and 3b vanish, in the sense that 
leverage and leverage after the crisis are no longer significant in explaining Chinese outward 
investment. Chinese firm numbers are also reduced (from 170 to 106) and it is difficult to say 
if this too influenced the overall results. 
Heterogeneity of industries of investment:  The industries of outward investment are different 
in India and China and these differences in the industrial composition of investment may be 
driving the results reported in Table 4. We used industry as a matching criterion, as firms 
operating in a similar industry face similar business and regulatory environments (Boter & 
Holmquist, 1996). The industry criterion in our case ensures that we match firms having a 
comparable amount of resources to fund investment and to obtain external credit, so we are 
comparing like for like. For this purpose, we select three industries with most observations 
from both countries. These industries are Electronics, Oil & Gas, and Chemicals. The sample 
distribution across industries provided in Table 1 shows that these three industries account for 
64 Indian and 54 Chinese firms (21% of the Indian and 25% of the Chinese sample 
respectively). Firstly, we re-estimate equation 2 after pooling the two country samples and 
introducing a country dummy for China (China_Dummy). The coefficient of the 
China_Dummy is statistically significant indicating a strong country effect. Next, we re-
estimate equation (2) for each country (following our earlier estimation routine). The findings 
still support Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2a, but not for hypotheses 2b, 3a, and 3b. Thus, industry 
heterogeneity probably drives some of our findings, but the much smaller number of firms 
also compromises the new estimations. 
5.4.2. Exchange rate movements before and after the financial crisis 
The financial crisis of 2008 had major implications for the foreign exchange rate (Frankel and 
Saravelos, 2012), which directly influence the firms’ investment. To investigate the 
possibility that the variable indicating the crisis period in our model is also picking up some 
level of exchange rate movements, we re-estimated Model 3 by adding three exchange rates 
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namely Dom/EUR, Dom/USD, and Dom/GBP (Domestic to Foreign Currency).12 For China, 
ER_USD (exchange rate against the US Dollar) is positively significant for foreign 
investment, while we find no effect for the sample of Indian firms. The joint significance test 
for the inclusion of exchange rate variables is significant for explaining the foreign 
investment of Chinese sampled firms while insignificant for Indian sampled firms. Despite 
this, the support for all hypotheses remain robust even in these new results, although the 
coefficients of the interacted FC terms, become smaller confirming that at least some of the 
effects of the crisis were mediated by exchange rates. 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Theoretical contributions 
Our paper contributes to theorising about the institutional advantages and 
disadvantages of EMNEs arising from financial market imperfections (Gaur et al., 2018; 
Singh & Kaur, 2014; Rui and Yip, 2008; Buckley et al., 2007) and shows that motives for 
internationalization condition the source of financing and thus have an impact on overall firm 
investment.   Although countries may share an institutional deficiency, they may not be 
handicapped by it, in the same way. Much depends on what the firms want to do and if the 
adverse institutional environment actually acts as a hindrance or could be used to their 
advantage.  In turn, this makes the relationships between CSA, CSD and FSA much more 
nuanced and context specific than usually emphasised. 
Despite many continuing problems, Indian financial institutions have slowly reformed 
to largely follow market-based rules in the allocation of investment finance and they show 
some breadth in the availability of financial instruments. In contrast, until only a few decades 
ago the private financial sector virtually did not exist in China and all banking was done 
through branches of the state-owned People’s Bank of China. Though this picture has now 
changed, the Chinese financial sector is still largely controlled by the state (the five largest 
Chinese banks are majority-owned by the central government) which lends funds through 
banks based on planned investment targets and moral suasion. The easier availability of 
leverage finance for “going global” was a real institutional advantage for Chinese firms 
wishing to acquire international assets, while Indian firms despite facing somewhat better 
financial institutions at home also had to deal with greater scrutiny of their investments, 
 
12 These results are available on request. 
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which in turn was a disadvantage for firms wishing to invest overseas. After the financial 
crisis of 2008, neither well-functioning financial markets overseas nor the reformed domestic 
financial sector, wanted to bear the larger risk that foreign investments entailed which hurt 
Indian investments abroad. 
An interesting aspect of our argument is that the dynamics of interaction between 
motives and financing in an upswing differed considerably from the dynamics of interaction 
in a downswing. In an upswing, there is optimism in investment opportunities of all kinds, 
and financial markets (mature and immature) largely support investments. However, in a 
downswing, there is pessimism about the growth of investible opportunities and finance is 
harder to come by. Investing in strategic assets capable of generating incomes in the longer 
term may be an easier case to make than investing in projects to serve markets with shrinking 
demand. Financial lending based on market-based rules may prioritise pulling out of risky 
markets. Patient finance geared to enabling investments (such as provided by the Chinese 
state banks) may however be more open to such investments.13   
6.2. Managerial and policy implications 
For managers of EMNEs, our findings suggest internationalisation should be guided by 
both the costs and new opportunities in the global environment. In particular, managers of 
EMNEs should focus not only on internal financial resources but also consider external 
financial support when making outward FDI decisions. Managers of EMNEs should develop 
both conventional and relationship-based capabilities to overcome financial constraints. 
Equally, they should seek to capitalise on new sources of growth and be prepared to change 
course (e.g. from market to asset seeking) if the circumstances are favourable to such a 
switch. 
Our findings also offer some useful policy implications. We demonstrate how financial 
availability, outward investments’ motives and market economic conditions relate with each 
other. Our results suggest the government financial support should be an integral component 
of the internationalization endeavours of EMNEs, in a manner similar to the subsidy enjoyed 
by exports. To this end, China’s experience with state financed outward investment holds 
lessons for other countries/ regions wanting to internationalise.  
 
13 To some extent, this echoes well-known arguments in the varieties of capitalism literature on the difference 
between insider and outsider capital markets, with Chinese financial sector being more like an insider dominated 




The importance of financial institutional development for outward investment also 
holds other policy lessons. Although India and China have followed different models of 
reform, with India opting for western-style financial markets and China evolving along with 
more patient, insider capital models, there is no doubt that without some financial reform, 
outward investment would not have taken place at all. Studies have shown that integration of 
trade and investment can transfer institutional practices that mitigate corruption (Li et al., 
2012), improve managerial practices (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2009), and encourage legitimate 
institutional practices (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003; Ahlstrom et al., 2007), enhance micro-
financing activity (Chen et al., 2017), and increase investment and entrepreneurship 
(Newman et al., 2017). Building resilient financial institutions help internationalisation (in 
both its main forms) and ultimately improve economic growth (Tomizawa et al., 2019).   
6.3. Limitations and future research 
Our conclusions and contributions are inevitably influenced by the nature and quality of 
our data and we have noted these limitations in several places. We cannot control all the 
different sources of firm heterogeneity in our data and these may have influenced our results. 
Similarly, we assumed that motives condition the mode of financing chosen but it may be the 
case that firms select the type of investment jointly with the mode of financing they are able 
to access.   
A major limitation of our study is the inability to address intra-country regional 
variations. Earlier studies on EMNES suggest that regional differences within a country are 
important for outward investment because of the differences in regional endowments 
(including access to external finance) and geographical concentration of industrial activities 
(Fleisher et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2010; Panda and Gupta, 2004; Poncet, 2005). Regional 
endowments such as market size and factor inputs are known to be important for the location 
of overseas investment, while geographical concentration of industry may give rise to 
increased competition which may push firms to seek opportunities in foreign markets. Other 
studies also acknowledge the importance of regional institutional differences for domestic 
investment (Chan et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2008). In our study, we used crude regional 
dummies to control the within-country regional differences, but the results were not 
significant due to the small numbers of firms for each of the regions. Future studies with 
larger datasets (that include both public and private firms) can account for variability across 
regions in a country should examine how outward investment is financed across subnational 
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regions due to political and cultural differences, policy variations, and differential economic 
development.   
Another possible limitation is the inability to control the geographical location of 
outward investment as we used parent-firm level data in our analysis. The impact of the 
financial crisis was harsher in Europe and North America as compared to Asia and Africa 
(Reddy et al., 2014). We do not know if this started a process of redirection of outward 
investment in Chinese and Indian companies, or perhaps a process of rationalisation of 
investments.   
Going forward, investigation of motives and modes of financing of EMNE investments 
with larger datasets that combine project level information with financial information using 
the framework we have developed in this paper will yield more robust insights, but we hope 
our paper has cast the first stone in that direction.  
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       Table 1: Sample distribution across sectors 
Sectors Sub-sectors Number of firms 
  Indian sample Chinese sample 
Manufacturing  Automobile 18 (6) 12(6) 
 Electronics 35 (12) 20(9) 
 Iron and Steel 21 (7) 16(8) 
 Chemicals 38 (14) 28(13) 
 Pharmaceutical 11 (4) 9(4) 
 Telecommunication 6 (2) 4(2) 
 Textile products 34 (12) 17(8) 
Service Software (IT) 
industry 
12 (4) 5(2) 
 Engineering services 18 (6) 7(4) 
Oil and Gas Oil and Gas 26 (9) 33(16) 
 Mining 9 (3) 22(10) 
Agriculture & allied activities Agriculture related 
products 
28 (10) 18(9) 
Construction Construction 12 (4) 9(4) 
Miscellaneous  30 (10) 12(5) 
Entire sample  298 212 










Table 2: Variable construction 
Variables Acronym Definition Source 
Investment I Change in net capital stock from period t-1 to t, plus 
accumulated depreciation  
ORBIS 
Foreign investment If Change in net capital stock from period t-1 to t, plus 




Id Difference between total investment and foreign 
investment 
 
Capital stock K Tangible assets of period t ORBIS 
Cash flow CF Firm operating net income at the end of period t plus the 
accumulated depreciation 
ORBIS 
Financial Crisis FC Dummy variable indicating financial crisis period. As an 
alternative proxy it is measured as the number of years 
since crisis. It takes value 0 before 2009 and 
incrementally increasing from 2009. 
 
Net Sale Sale Net sale at the end of period t ORBIS 
Foreign Sale For_Sale Total sale of all foreign subsidiaries at the end of period t ORBIS 
Domestic Sale Dom_Sale Difference between firm’s net total sale and its foreign 
sale 
 
Moving Average of 
Domestic Sale 
MA_Dom_Sale Three year moving average of domestic sale  
Total Leverage Leverage Book value of total debt at the end of period t ORBIS 
Foreign listing  FList A dummy variable taking value 1 if a firm is 
internationally listed, 0 otherwise.  
ORBIS 
Business group BG A dummy variable taking value 1 if a firm is affiliated to 
business group, 0 otherwise 
ORBIS 
State-ownership SOE A dummy variable taking value 1 if there is presence of 







Table 3: Descriptive values of variables across countries 
VARIABLES India 
 
  China 
 









I/K 2475 0.60*** 0.87 
 




Id/K 2475 0.39*** 0.28 
 
0.36***  1433 0.67*** 0.34 
 
0.62*** 
If/K 2475 0.20*** 0.82 
 
0.01***  1433 0.13*** 0.33 
 
0.00*** 
CF/K 2475 0.34*** 0.27 
 
0.28***  1433 0.46*** 0.24 
 
0.46*** 
FC 2475 1.35*** 1.97 
 
0.60***  1433 1.85*** 2.29 
 
0.96*** 
FList 2475 0.30*** 0.24 
 
0.24***  1433 0.27*** 0.29 
 
0.16*** 
Sale/K 2475 1.88*** 1.97 
 
1.37**  1433 2.16*** 2.30 
 
1.30** 
For_Sale/K 2475 0.59*** 0.62 0.43**  1433 0.68*** 0.72 0.41** 
MA_Dom_Sale 2475 1.22 1.16 0.18***  1433 1.34 1.41 0.00*** 
Leverage /K 2475 0.63*** 1.85 
 
0.00***  1433 4.20*** 5.68 
 
2.20*** 
BG 2475 0.39*** 1.04 
 
0.12***  1433 0.17*** 0.27 
 
0.00*** 
SOE 2475 0.01*** 0.07 
 
0.00***  1433 0.19*** 0.29 
 
0.00*** 
***, **, and * is significant level at 1%,5%, and 10%. It is indicating that difference in means and medians 
across countries are significantly different from 0 across countries. 
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Alternative Measure of the 
Crisis as a count variable 
(Panel B) 
VARIABLES India China  India China 
 1 2  3 4 
(If/K)it-1 
-0.16 1.49  -0.29 0.94 
(0.20) (1.67)  (0.27) (1.32) 
(If/K)2it-1 
0.04 -1.07  0.10 -0.83 
(0.06) (1.55)  (0.11) (1.22) 
(CF/K)it-1 
2.44* 0.59**  1.43*** 0.66** 
(1.38) (0.28)  (0.37) (0.27) 
FCit 
0.01 -0.01  -0.01 -0.02* 
(0.14) (0.06)  (0.02) (0.01) 
(CF/K)it-1× FCit 
2.60* -0.32**  0.07* -0.03** 
(1.24) (0.14)  (0.04) (0.01) 
FListit 
-0.37 -0.12  -0.10 -0.14 
(0.31) (0.25)  (0.15) (0.20) 
(CF/K)it-1× FListit 
-3.35* -0.40**  -1.12** -0.39* 
(1.96) (0.18)  (0.54) (0.22) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 
0.31* 0.18  0.04* 0.23 
(0.16) (0.11)  (0.02) (0.22) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 × FCit 
-1.01* 0.15  -0.12* 0.01 
(0.69) (0.12)  (0.07) (0.01) 
(MA_Dom_Sale/K)it-1 
0.06 0.04  0.04 0.02 
(0.24) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.04) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 
0.65 0.04**  0.16 0.02* 
(0.91) (0.02)  (0.15) (0.01) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 × FCit 
-0.49 0.02*  -0.02 0.03** 
(0.84) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) 
BGit 
0.08 0.20  0.01 0.04 
(0.36) (0.21)  (0.10) (0.33) 
(CF/K)it-1× BGit 
-0.75 -0.27  -0.10 -0.46 
(0.56) (0.22)  (0.20) (0.29) 
SOEit 
0.51 -0.24  0.31 -0.21 
(1.53) (0.30)  (1.72) (0.22) 
(CF/K)it-1× SOEit 
-0.68 -0.41**  -2.01 -0.40* 
(4.28) (0.19)  (4.06) (0.19) 
Observations 790 534  790 534 
Number of id 264 170  264 170 
Arellano-Bond- AR(2) Prob 0.15 0.92  0.43 0.65 
Hansen test Probabilities 0.98 0.65  0.92 0.95 
This table reports the system GMM regression results. If/K is foreign investment in year t, CF/K is cash flow, FC is a dummy 
variable indicating Financial Crisis period. FList is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is listed internationally. 
Leverage/K is total leverage, For_Sale/K is foreign sales, MA_Dom_Sale/K is moving average of domestic sales, BG denotes 
business group, and SOE denotes state-ownership. Insignificant probabilities of AR (2) and Hansen tests indicate that there exists 
no serial correlation and used instruments are valid. Robust Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * are 





Table 5: Financing of investment based on motives of FDI 











-0.62 -0.36  -0.50 0.87 
(0.79) (0.33)  (0.43) (0.72) 
(If/K)2it-1 
0.08 0.01  0.46 -0.67 
(0.13) (0.03)  (0.64) (0.64) 
(CF/K)it-1 
1.78** 0.88*  0.85*** 0.56* 
(0.80) (0.48)  (0.28) (0.31) 
FCit 
0.39 0.19  -0.01 0.01 
(0.25) (0.12)  (0.04) (0.03) 
(CF/K)it-1× FCit 
1.35* 0.74*  -0.56 -0.29* 
(0.75) (0.43)  (0.57) (0.15) 
FListit 
0.02 -0.39  1.35 0.04 
(0.14) (0.37)  (1.01) (0.06) 
(CF/K)it-1× FListit 
-0.59** -0.93*  -0.39* -0.44** 
(0.24) (0.53)  (0.31) (0.19) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 
0.14* 0.02  -0.64 -0.07 
(0.07) (0.19)  (0.62) (0.22) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 × FCit 
-0.04* -0.21  0.45 0.07 
(0.02) (0.21)  (0.33) (0.23) 
(MA_Dom_Sale/K)it-1 
0.11 0.13  0.03 0.06 
(0.13) (0.10)  (0.02) (0.08) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 
0.04 0.09  0.07* 0.02* 
(0.04) (0.10)  (0.04) (0.01) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 × FCit 
0.06 0.09  0.07 0.03* 
(0.08) (0.10)  (0.09) (0.02) 
BGit 
0.12 0.11  -0.09 -0.05 
(0.20) (0.17)  (0.18) (0.08) 
(CF/K)it-1× BGit 
-0.01 -0.01  -0.26* -0.21 
(0.08) (0.09)  (0.15) (0.18) 
SOEit 
-0.18 -1.08  -0.08 -0.02 
(0.66) (1.76)  (0.14) (0.11) 
(CF/K)it-1× SOEit 
1.12 1.95  0.14 -0.03 
(1.12) (1.57)  (0.23) (0.17) 
Observations 299 491  181 353 
Number of id 109 155  58 112 
AR (2) Test 0.68 0.94  0.58 0.43 
Hansen Test 0.99 0.99  0.96 0.99 





Table A1: Correlation matrix 
Panel A: Indian firms 
 If/K Id/K CF/K FC For_Sale Dom_Sale Leverage BG SOE FList 
If/K 1          
Id/K 0.00 1         
CF/K 0.05 0.11 1        
FC -0.00 -0.01 0.01 1       
For_Sale -0.01 0.00 0.17 -0.04 1      
Dom_Sale -0.01 0.00 0.17 -0.04 0.57 1     
Leverage 0.11 0.09 0.19 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 1    
BG 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.00 1   
SOE -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.09 1  
FList 0.05 0.08 0.13 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 0.10 -0.00 0.04 1 
Panel B: Chinese firms 
If/K 1          
Id/K 0.03 1         
CF/K 0.06 0.19 1        
FC -0.02 -0.09 0.01 1       
For_Sale 0.05 0.00 0.15 -0.10 1      
Dom_Sale 0.05 0.00 0.14 -0.10 0.63 1     
Leverage 0.19 0.02 -0.07 -0.9 0.26 0.26 1    
BG -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 0.08 -0.13 -0.13 -0.15 1   
SOE 0.11 0.03 0.18 -0.09 0.15 0.15 0.14 -0.48 1  





     Table A2: Estimations with Two-Way Clustering 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES India China 
(If/K)it-1 -0.22 1.20 
 (0.36) (1.38) 
(If/K)2it-1 0.05 -0.93 
 (0.03) (1.25) 
(CF/K)it-1 0.80** 0.30*** 
 (0.28) (0.02) 
FCit -0.05 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
(CF/K)it-1× FCit 0.51* -0.01*** 
 (0.27) (0.00) 
FListit -0.26 -0.01 
 (0.20) (0.13) 
(CF/K)it-1× FListit -1.90*** -0.43* 
 (0.60) (0.20) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 0.68* 0.16 
 (0.37) (0.09) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 × FCit -0.18*** 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.01) 
(MA_Dom_Sale/K)it-1 0.20 0.02 
 (0.16) (0.02) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 -0.02 0.02* 
 (0.12) (0.01) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 × FCit -0.01 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
BGit 0.28 0.24 
 (0.33) (0.20) 
(CF/K)it-1× BGit -0.44 -0.11 
 (1.12) (0.32) 
SOEit 1.46 -0.31 
 (1.21) (0.17) 
(CF/K)it-1× SOEit 0.91 -0.08* 
 (1.29) (0.04) 
Observations 790 534 
Number of id 264 170 
Arellano-Bond- AR(2) Prob 0.39 0.88 
Hansen test Probabilities 0.98 0.99 




Table A3: Endogeneity test 
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  (1) (2) 
  India China 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 0.95 0.66 
Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.32 0.41 
 
 
   Table A4: Controlling for Regional Effects 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES India China 
(If/K)it-1 -0.05 1.17 
 (0.12) (1.47) 
(If/K)2it-1 -0.01 -0.97 
 (0.02) (1.32) 
(CF/K)it-1 1.01** 0.67** 
 (0.41) (0.28) 
FCit -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
(CF/K)it-1× FCit 0.18* -0.02** 
 (0.10) (0.01) 
FListit -0.29 0.05 
 (0.34) (0.14) 
(CF/K)it-1× FListit -1.36*** -0.55*** 
 (0.50) (0.21) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 0.22* 0.26 
 (0.11) (0.20) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 × FCit -0.08* -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.03) 
(MA_Dom_Sale/K)it-1 0.05 0.06 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 -0.31 0.04* 
 (0.28) (0.02) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 × FCit -0.03 0.01** 
 (0.05) (0.00) 
BGit 0.31 -0.21 
 (0.29) (0.21) 
(CF/K)it-1× BGit -0.01 -0.28 
 (0.32) (0.27) 
SOEit -0.90 -0.01 
 (1.85) (0.14) 
(CF/K)it-1× SOEit -1.14 -0.33** 
 (3.18) (0.13) 
South_Central 0 -0.08 
 (0) (0.26) 
North_West 0 0.15 
 (0) (0.16) 
Observations 790 534 
Number of id 264 170 
Arellano-Bond- AR(2) Prob 0.54 0.49 
Hansen test Probabilities 0.99 0.65 
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Joint Significance Test for regional dummy variables - 0.76 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A5: Exclusion of State-Owned Firms 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES India China 
(If/K)it-1 -0.69 -0.04 
 (1.29) (0.31) 
(If/K)2it-1 0.13 -0.09 
 (1.06) (0.23) 
(CF/K)it-1 0.39* 0.58** 
 (0.21) (0.25) 
FCit -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
(CF/K)it-1× FCit 0.24*** -0.02* 
 (0.09) (0.01) 
FListit 0.09 -0.04 
 (0.17) (0.25) 
(CF/K)it-1× FListit -1.01** -0.68** 
 (0.49) (0.27) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 0.19* 0.07 
 (0.10) (0.20) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 × FCit -0.09* 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.01) 
(MA_Dom_Sale/K)it-1 0.03 0.09 
 (0.08) (0.14) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 -0.22 -0.01 
 (0.18) (0.01) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 × FCit -0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
BGit 0.03 -0.14 
 (0.14) (0.16) 
(CF/K)it-1× BGit 0.16 -0.31 
 (0.22) (0.47) 
Observations 754 308 
Number of id 256 106 
Arellano-Bond- AR(2) Prob 0.83 0.29 
Hansen test Probabilities 0.99 0.99 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
      










































Number of id 118 
Arellano-Bond- AR(2) Prob 0.39 
Hansen test Probabilities 0.99 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    Table A7: Matched sample from specific industries 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES India China 
(If/K)it-1 -0.08 1.06 
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 (0.53) (0.75) 
(If/K)2it-1 0.24 -0.82 
 (0.24) (1.49) 
(CF/K)it-1 1.11* 0.62** 
 (0.64) (0.27) 
FCit 0.04 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.02) 
(CF/K)it-1× FCit 0.09** -0.02* 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
FListit 0.41 -0.03 
 (0.40) (0.11) 
(CF/K)it-1× FListit -0.96* -0.40* 
 (0.55) (0.22) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 0.26* 0.16 
 (0.15) (0.18) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 × FCit -0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
(MA_Dom_Sale/K)it-1 0.01 0.01 
 (0.09) (0.04) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 -0.23 0.01 
 (0.46) (0.02) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 × FCit -0.04 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.01) 
BGit -0.19 -0.16 
 (0.12) (0.16) 
(CF/K)it-1× BGit -0.04 -0.55 
 (0.07) (0.40) 
SOEit 0 -0.22 
 (0) (0.32) 
(CF/K)it-1× SOEit -1.30 -0.42* 
 (0.92) (0.23) 
Observations 201 167 
Number of id 64 54 
Arellano-Bond- AR(2) Prob 0.38 0.30 
Hansen test Probabilities 0.99 0.98 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
   Table A8: Addition of Exchange Rate Variables 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES India China 
(If/K)it-1 -0.29 1.50 
 (0.23) (1.62) 
(If/K)2it-1 0.10 -1.03 
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 (0.11) (1.48) 
(CF/K)it-1 1.91*** 0.44* 
 (0.58) (0.25) 
FCit -0.15 0.01 
 (0.09) (0.02) 
(CF/K)it-1× FCit 0.14* -0.04** 
 (0.08) (0.02) 
FListit 0.51 0.12 
 (0.44) (0.23) 
(CF/K)it-1× FListit -2.00** -0.29* 
 (0.91) (0.17) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 0.31* 0.39 
 (0.18) (0.41) 
(For_Sale/K)it-1 × FCit -0.10* -0.04 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
(MA_Dom_Sale/K)it-1 0.11 -0.08 
 (0.15) (0.08) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 -0.19 0.02* 
 (0.13) (0.01) 
(Leverage/K)it-1 × FCit -0.04 0.01* 
 (0.05) (0.00) 
BGit 0.13 -0.07 
 (0.41) (0.18) 
(CF/K)it-1× BGit -0.03 -0.22 
 (0.41) (0.24) 
SOEit -1.25 -0.28 
 (2.36) (0.27) 
(CF/K)it-1× SOEit 1.97 -0.30** 
 (3.62) (0.13) 
ER_EUR -0.02 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.04) 
ER_USD -0.01 0.04* 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
ER_GBP 0.02 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 790 534 
Number of id 264 170 
Arellano-Bond- AR(2) Prob 0.11 0.83 
Hansen test Probabilities 0.98 0.53 
Joint Significance Test for regional dummy variables 0.57 0.03 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
